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The Independence of Judges
James Zagel*
and
Adam Winkler"
I.

INTRODUCTION

One might begin by asking why we are having this symposium.
"Judicial independence" arises infrequently in litigation, so there are few
snarling doctrinal knots to loosen and even fewer precedents to ponder.
The truth is that our legislative and executive branches of government
rarely attempt to interfere with the decisions of the federal judiciary. Of
the few cases that have been decided, most seem surprisingly minor in
their importance and insight.' It seems to us immensely difficult to
make many judgments about judicial independence in the abstract that
are likely to win widespread agreement, and in this area abstraction
abounds. Even lawyers, for all their willingness to take sides on any
issue, prefer to have some good precedent or doctrine on which to rely,
much as cowpunchers prefer trained horses. The notion of judicial
independence-what it is and what it requires-remains largely
undefined because few important battles have been fought over it. Ever
since Chief Justice John Marshall's vigorous defense of judicial review,'
there has evolved a general consensus in America that judicial independence is a good thing, even if none of us know precisely what it is.
When independence is neither challenged nor threatened there is little
incentive to make clear and distinct the core concepts; war forces you to
* Judge, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois. University of
Chicago (B.A., M.A., 1962); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1965).
** Georgetown University (B.S.F.S. 1990); New York University (J.D., 1993). Member,

California Bar.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a

congressional limitation on Supreme Court jurisdiction); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (holding Congress can prescribe rules of procedure for federal courts); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding federal sentencing guidelines constitutional).
2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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consider exactly what. you wish to defend. In such an environment,
scholars can nary afford to believe that their wisdom and thoughtfulness
will actually influence the shape of the law. Inactive doctrine is also
impenetrable doctrine.
Ultimately, scholars have symposia such as this because they are
intellectually interested, and not because they hope to influence doctrine.
Judicial independence is. a sacred idea in American constitutionalism,
and scholars think about it because it is an interesting problem on the
level of theory. As a theoretical matter, judicial independence has been
approached from few different angles. Almost all discussions of judicial
independence-including those of this symposium-focus on the
undeniably important dilemma of executive or legislative interference
with the decisions of the judiciary. The common concern of these
discussions is the entangling of the three separate branches of government in a way that the judiciary's decisions are pressured or influenced.' Commentators emphasize the Constitution's salary and tenure
provisions,4 and the problem of congressional limitations on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts." This is essentially a structural

3. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and
PoliticalPerspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995).
Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Gilbert Merritt's objection to Congress enacting a
presidential line-item veto over, among other things, the budget of the judiciary reflects a
structurally-defined version ofjudicial independence. The ChiefJudge's concern is that the
President might be able to interfere with adjudication by exercising the veto power over
appropriations for the judiciary. The executive branch is the most active litigant in the
federal courts and presidents might use or threaten the use of the line-item veto to punish
adverse rulings (something that Congress, which traditionally authorizes all appropriations, will have little chance to do because Congress, as a body, rarely has cases pending
in the federal courts). According to the Chief Judge, [T"he balance would be titled
dangerously toward executive dominance and control over the judiciary ifthe president had
line-item veto authority over the judicial branch." See John Flynn Rooney, Federal
JudiciaryShould Be Exempt From Line-Item Veto, CongressTold, CH. DAILY LAWYER, Jan
13, 1995, at 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5. See, e.g., Lawrence Sager, The Supreme Court,1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95
HAReV. L. REV. 17 (1981). For further examples, see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View
of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the OriginalUnderstandingof Article
III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,65 B. U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Lea
Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for
Constitutional Claims: DiscriminatoryJurisdictionalRules and the Conflict of Laws, 69
VA. L. REV. 819 (1983). This debate is not new. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 823-27, 892-98 (1987) (1833).
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approach, in that judicial independence is conceived of as something
arising out of various provisions of the Constitution pertaining to the
structure of government.
There are, however, other possible ways to think about judicial
independence. We want to engage one such possibility to see if it might
be profitable. We want to consider what judicial independence means
from an introspectiveangle-from the inside-out as it were, seen through
the judges' eyes. An introspective approach seeks to understand judicial
independence not by reference to the structural organization of the three
branches of government, but by reference to the judge's own perception
of her ability to adjudicate cases. Our model is a self-reflective judge,
sitting alone in chambers, pondering the ways in which she is independent. Grappling with what judicial independence looks like from an
introspective angle may teach something new about judicial independence and what it requires.
More specifically, an introspective understanding of judicial independence reveals that judges occupy a place of high tension, located at the
intersection of numerous different restraints and liberties. An introspective understanding indicates that structural arguments are incomplete
because they focus solely on the threat posed to the judiciary by the
other two branches of government, ignoring what is made clear by
introspection, the threat to independent adjudication posed by and
within the judiciary itself. An introspective approach also shows that
many forms of constraint felt by judges that interfere with independent
adjudication exist beyond the realm of law and legal doctrine, partaking
of the realm of culture. Finally, it shows that the structure of the
Constitution, while sometimes important to the perspective of a single
judge deciding a single case, is simply one part of the foundation of
independence. Some of this may seem to have little relevance for how
to interpret the Constitution or how to decide controversies involving
interferences with independent adjudication.
It is nevertheless
significant if we want to come to a better theoretical understanding of
what it means to have "independent" judges and of what constraints
bind judges from asserting that independence throughout the exercise of
the judicial power.
Part II of this Article presents the argument for moving beyond
structural analyses of independence. This Part defines what it means
to understand judicial independence "introspectively" and describes the
problems with a purely structural approach. Part III undertakes one
interpretation of what judicial independence means from an introspective vantage point. It considers the types of restraints imposed on
judges that although hindering the exercise of independent adjudication,
evade detection by a purely structural argument.
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One note before we continue. In keeping with the theme of this
symposium, our analysis centers on judges sitting on the federal bench.
This generally means the federal trial judges in the district courts
because they make up the majority of the federal judges. The arguments
made and insights offered may or may not apply to other judges,
depending upon where they sit and their duties.
II.

A.

WHY Go BEYOND STRUCTURE?

Structure: A PartialPicture of Independence
Structural definitions of judicial independence are mainly negative.
They tell us what judicial independence is not, rather than what it is.
By looking at what members of the executive or legislative branches of
government cannot do, a structural approach indicates what is inconsistent with independence. A judge is independent in this view because the
President cannot fire her and members of Congress cannot cut her salary
nor transfer her to East Glockenspiel, Illinois solely to hear foreclosure
cases. Structural understandings inform us of those things that impinge
on judicial independence without revealing just what is being impinged
upon.
That may be the best we can do; some things perhaps can only be
defined by what they are not. Still, a judge might say, "One of the
things I am paid to do as a judge is be independent, so it would be nice
to know what that is." She might want to know what independence
consists of, not only what it prevents others from doing. But those who
write about the structural protection of independence seldom write about
the independence of a single judge, they write instead about the
independence of the judiciary. The title of this symposium is indicative:
"Federal Judicial Independence" rather than, say, "Federal Judges'
Independence."
We do not propose to advance understanding of independence by
concluding that the key to knowledge lies in the distinction between
"judicial independence" and "judge's independence," only the latter of
which counts. It would be wonderful to find such a simple key, but the
key does not work by itself. Nevertheless, the independence of a judge,
as an individual adjudicator, is both an important and neglected concept
that differs from the concept of the independence of the judiciary, as an
institution. Nor are the two concepts entirely complementary. The
institution of the judiciary imposes constraints on and directs the
decisions of individual judges. An "independent judiciary" restrains the
"independence of the judge." Unscrutinized when we look at the
structural provisions of the Constitution are those interferences with a
judge's independent adjudication that arise out of, for example, the
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actor's membership in the judiciary. This oversight is problematic in
that, ultimately, all judicial acts are those of a single judge, even in a
court where it takes the votes of five single justices to enter judgment.
Defining independence by way of structure causes one to ignore a host
of constraints on individual judges that stem from, among other things,
the judiciary itself, legal culture, and the social environment of judges.
Even if structural analysis is not the only way to understand judicial
independence, obviously structure always counts in this country. The
text of the Constitution invites structural arguments, and all constitutional analysis must begin, everyone agrees, with the words of the
text-though where it ends is subject to much debate. You read the
document and though the Constitution does not use the words "judicial
independence," Article III contains provisions assuring the tenure and
salary of judges and you infer that this must be the root of judicial
independence.
A structural approach is, however, likely to include only bits and
pieces of what it is to be independent to a judge because it is inherently
concerned only with the relationships between the branches of government. Consequently, it obscures the constraints on independence
imposed on judges from within the judiciary. Even if the other branches
of government cannot remove a judge from a case or mandate a certain
decision's outcome, other judges may be able to do just that, either
through disqualification or normal appellate proceedings. Some might
say, well, that's a different story. But is it really? It doesn't much
matter to the judge who restrains him, he is restrained. Who imposes
these restraints and controls him may present a difference with regard
to how the judge feels about the legitimacy of our governmental system,
but there is little difference with regard to his independence in
adjudicating cases. In either instance he is constrained, often against
his will, to a particular outcome or course of behavior.
A purely structural analysis of judicial independence might be
defended by the claim that structural independence is the sort of
independence most important to the litigants whose cases are decided in
federal courthouses. Litigants, particularly the politically unpopular,
want to know that the other (majoritarian-influenced) branches of
government will not interfere with their cases. But this ignores the real
world context of litigation. Most citizens who come in contact with the
courts are not politically unpopular and, much more importantly, would
not insist on judges being independent of the other branches of
government if the litigants thought "dependence" was more likely to
affirm their vision of justice in the particular case. Perhaps this is why
few litigants refuse to have the government join their side as amicus in
a case. Most probably hope the backing of the government will itself
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prove weighty with the judge. Litigants welcome the government's
arguments, but they really want the stature of the government to
impress the judge and perhaps gain a little edge in the litigation. If this
view of litigant preferences is correct, then it is in tension with our
aspirational ideals for the administration of justice. But litigants are
not expected to tend to these aspirations; they are only expected to abide
by the rules. Judges (and the rest of the disinterested society) are the
stewards of ideals of justice and are supposed to give equal attention to
the arguments of a carnival bozo as to those of the Attorney General if
the two go head-to-head in a case. According to principle, it is the
arguments that ought to count, not who makes them, but one can hardly
condemn a litigant who thought, no matter how cynically, that having
the Attorney General, not a carnival bozo, on her side would bode well
for her pursuit of "justice."
Most people (not just litigants) are probably less concerned with
structurally-defined judicial independence than most legal commentators
because the general public may not perceive the powers to be really all
that separate to begin with. Much of the citizenry may unself-consciously accept the legal realist views of judicial decision-making that law
students still fight so hard against! If the pageant of the Supreme
Court confirmation process does not sufficiently communicate the
message that judges are indeed political and that law is chosen and
made, not discovered and found, then it surely gets across in the mass
media through the daily reporting of the news. It is now the rule rather
than the exception that news coverage of major court decisions include
a run down of the presumed political leanings of the judges. 7 When the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in the fall of
1993 that the military's policy of removing avowed homosexuals from
service was unconstitutional on due process grounds," The New York
Tmes made a point of remarking on the supposed political biases of the
judges. 'Ibday's opinion was by the three most liberal members of the
Federal appeals court here .... The three, who were randomly selected

6. Two of the foremost legal realists were Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. See Karl
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930);
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). For a history of legal realism, see
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960,169-246 (1992).
The influence ofpractical experience "doing" law, rather than just studying it, may dispel
lawyers from their idealism and teach them the personal (and political) idiosyncrasies of
judicial decision-making. Cf Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal
Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Cffice, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989).
7. The example we provide in the text could be supplemented with those cited in Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y. U. L. REV. 1185, 1192 n.37 (1992).
8. See Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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for the case, were all appointed by President Jimmy Carter and are the
only members (ofthe circuit] ... appointed by a Democrat."" When the
en banc panel eventually overturned the ruling a year later,10 The
Washington Post chimed in: "[Judge] Silberman[, the author of the
ruling,] was joined by six judges, all of whom were appointees of
presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. A dissent was filed by two
appointees of President Jimmy Carter and a judge selected by President
Clinton."" And this is from America's paper of record and one of the
main aspirants to this title; what do they say in the New York Post or
the Modesto Morning Star?
The public perception of structural judicial independence-or the lack
of it-is influenced as well by mass market fiction and film. Judges
seldom approve completely of the image of their work found in popular
entertainment. There is a certain inevitability about this; dramatic
necessity often requires that a story about a trial present the distinct
prospect, indeed likelihood, that justice will not be done. Otherwise, the
audience loses interest. Although many portrayals of judges show them
to be principled individuals, fully capable of objective impartiality,
dramatic tension is often created by portraying the possibility of political
corruption of the judge. For example, in the widely popular film Miracle
on 34th Street, 2 a judge presides over the trial of Santa Claus to
determine if the jolly old fellow really exists. The judge's political
sponsor tells him to decide the case in favor of the defendant Kris
Kringle if he wants to retain his judgeship. And it works. But no one
who watches the film rises in protest at the portrayal of this direct
assault on structual judicial independence and anyone who did would be
laughed into silence. Yet any competent judge who watches the film
could imagine more than a few ways by which the judge could have
avoided his dilemma or reached the verdict everyone wanted without the
Why did screenwriter George
intervention of the political boss.'
Seaton pick the political boss to pressure the judge? Presumably
because it would resonate in the minds of the general public. The
process'is self-reinforcing. Miracle on 34th Street has become a film
watched ritually by large portions of the population each year on

9. Stephen Labaton, Military Rebuffed by Appeals Court Over Homosexuals, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al.
10. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
11. Toni Locy, Appeals Court Backs Expulsion of Homosexual Midshipman,
WASHINGTON POsT, Nov. 23, 1994, at A2.
12. MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (Twentieth Century-Fox 1947).
13. In the recent remake of the film, John Hughes wrote the political boss and his
pressure tactics out of the script. It is safe to say, however, that Hughes' version will not
replace the original nor equal its cultural status.
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Christmas Day, and like any worthwhile ritual exerts a formative
influence on each generations understandings and comprehensions of
the- world. As children mature into adults and learn from their
experiences, they are unfortunately likely to discover more reasons to
doubt the existence of Santa Claus than to doubt the existence of
political influences on adjudication.
Public perception is not the be-all or end-all, nor are structural
analyses of independence flawed simply because they do not sell well in
the marketplace. Public perceptions are sometimes more nuanced than
we know. The modem news media identifies judges by the names of the
Presidents who nominated them, but the general public may understand
this as shorthand for supposed political ideology and not indication of
the judges owing personal loyalty to their nominators. But a political
ideology shared by judge and President may entail entangling common
commitments nonetheless, offering at least a kind of influence on the
adjudication of individual cases.
Another reason to move away from purely structure-oriented
discussions of judicial independence is that they promote a false picture
of the relationship between the branches of government, replacing the
dominant theme of cooperation with one of antagonism. The branches
are far more likely to be interlocked than separated. For all of Chief
Justice Marshall's persuasive power in Marbury v. Madison14 (and for
all the process-based theories articulated since United States v. Carolene
Products Co.'), "6' judicial review, in the sense of reversing acts of the
majoritarian legislature or the politically popular executive, is an
infrequent occurrence. Most often, judges affirm the acts of legislatures
and the exercises of authority by executives. It may be, as Professor
Alexander Bickel thought, that judges do not overturn legislatures and
executives because they want to conserve political capital.' It is hard
to imagine anyone intended or intends the "separation of powers" to
mean the "war of powers." It may also be that, in most instances, the
Congress, the President, and the judiciary are all reading from the same
page (the Constitution) and all 'read the page in pretty much the same
way. Questions of role and power are easily obliterated by consensus.
Or it may be that the principle of democratic decision-making, of
majority rules, is deeply entrenched in the American psyche, a thing
shared by just about everyone who has ever sat on the federal bench.

14. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
15. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Of course, we are talking about Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's
theory of judicial review suggested in footnote four. See id. at 153 n.4.
16. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

17. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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We will give a winking benefit of the doubt that this is what satirist
Finley Peter Dunne meant when. his Mr. Dooley said, "No matter
whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows
th' iliction returns.""'
Moreover, judges tend to bestow additional legitimacy onto the actions
of the other branches by affirming their legal validity, reinforcing their
moral weight among the citizens and advancing the interests of the
other branches. The political benefits of being legitimized by the court
are significant. Congress and the Executive may refrain from challenging judicial independence because it is worth something to them; it is
something they can appropriate. The other branches often gain from the
judicial imprimatur of validity because it comes from a body we
commonly perceive as "independent." And the legislative and executive
branches can depend more or less on the appointment and confirmation
process to weed out from the pool of judicial aspirants anyone believed
to be a real radical.
Even if a few radicals slip through the cracks, the risk of being
overturned in the name of independence remains minimal. Judges are
more likely to say "wait" than "stop," or "go ahead on the condition that"
than "never." When judges do say "no," elected officials are often the
first to use the judiciary's independence for political cover. Since the
exercise of judicial independence in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,"' any candidate for public office can easily take a forceful
stand in favor of public school children reciting the pledge of allegiance
at the dawn of each day "but, alas, my hands are tied." More than a few
candidates for public office are pleased they do not have to stump on the
pro-life platform in the post-Planned Parenthood v. Casey" world of
politics, and those who do so have no reason to believe that their policies
will ever take effect and truly anger pro-choice voters. Note that, in an
age where we often talk seriously about constitutional amendments,
such as the Balanced Budget Amendment 1 or the Flag Desecration
Amendment,22 only a handful of high-profile politicians have called
(and none have pushed) for amending the Constitution to eliminate the
right to terminate pregnancy. The decisions of independent judges spare
18. Finley Peter Dunne, The Supreme Court'sDecisions,in MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 21,
26 (1906) (1901).
19. 319 U.S. 624.(1943) (holding mandatory flag salute and pledge of allegiance in
public schools unconstitutional).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
21. See Robin Toner, Risking Euerything ForAmendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995,
at B9.
22.

See Steven A. Holmes, FlagAmendment Sent to House Foor,N.Y. TIMES,

1990, at A14.

June 20,
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the elected officials of our government the difficulty of voting meaningfully on issues which stringently divide their electoral constituents. This
may be bad for self-government, but it is one reason why judicial
independence is popular with professional politicians.
All this is not to say that the structural bases of independence, such
as tenure and salary protections, are irrelevant to judges--far from it.
Without structural protections, independent adjudication would not
likely occur very frequently. Nevertheless, the structual issues remain
more or less in the background; few judges ever feel that their salary or
their tenure are in doubt and subject to congressional or executive overreaching. American judges, knowing the infrequency of structural
infringements of their independence and depending on our legislators
and executives to share that aspect of the American political ethos
calling for an independent judiciary, may come to see the structural
questions as settled. They may eventually focus attention on other fault
lines that appear more active. Looking away from structure, they will
inevitably discover a host of different sorts of threats, impingements, and
restraints to their ability to adjudicate cases independently.
B. A Short Interlocution on Appeal Judges
A different kind of structure certainly comes into play within the
institution of the judiciary. We might call this sort of structure
"vertical," and the traditional structure-that regarding the different
branches ofgovernment-"horizontal." Independence may have different
contours to a trial judge than to an appellate judge, and to an intermediate appellate judge than to a judge in a court of last resort. A trial judge
has considerable independence in finding factual issues; structurally,
such rulings are not generally reviewable on appeal and hence the trial
judge's ruling will be final. This is not at all insignificant. What Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes said in reference to the rise of administrative bureaucracies and their emerging legal powers holds true for the
trial judge: "An unscrupulous administrator might be tempted to say,
'Let me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little who
lays down the general principles."' A court of last resort may feel
unique independence on findings of law for similar reasons arising out
of absence of oversight. Intermediate courts may find constraints from
both ends, bound from below by findings -of fact and from above by
precedents of law. Also as a matter of vertical structure, a trial court
judge may feel more independent because she makes her own decisions

23. See Charles Evans Hughes, ImportantWork of Uncle Sam'sLawyers,Address Before
the FederalBar Association, 17 A.B.A J. 237, 238 (1931).

1995]

INDEPENDENCEOF JUDGES

805

and they hold the day-though appellate oversight remains a distant
threat. An appellate judge must be concerned with building majorities
and coalitions in order to have her vision of the law made real. Building
majorities often means sacrifice and compromise, two characteristics not
commonly associated with those we understand to be independent.

III. AN INTROSPECTIVE VIEW OF INDEPENDENCE
Structural arguments, while helpful, may be sorely incomplete if
judges understand their adjudication to be tightly constrained by forces
other than the legislative and executive branches. Hence, an introspective analysis, such as that offered here, attempts to understand judicial
independence from the perspective of those who think they exercise it.
An introspective examination of the meaning of independence to the
federal judge might be helpful to somebody's cause (we do not care
whose) for it indicates what it is that the possessors of independence
think they have. One of the authors, as a federal judge, is in a
privileged position to answer this question, but the privilege is not
absolute. Most of us, like the other author, can succeed in putting
ourselves in the place of a judge. Certainly judges reverse the process
often enough; part of the enterprise of judging is to put oneself
thoroughly in another's place.
The introspective approach neither ignores nor deems irrelevant the
structural provisions of the Constitution, but it does not begin with
structure. It begins instead with the sense that there is independence
to be exercised and then searches the self and experience to discover
what it is. If there is any school of philosophical thought from which we
draw in undertaking this analysis, it is phenomenology. We seek to
understand the phenomenon of judicial independence by interpreting
how it presents itself in the experience of everyday life." There is no

24. Phenomenology has many versions and guises, but they all accept the method of
investigation represented by access to everyday experience. Edmund Husserl is often
described as one of founders of the philosophy of phenomenology. See generally EDMUND
HUSsERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONs (J.N. Findlay trans., 1970) (1900); IDEAS (W.R. Boyce
Gibson trans., 1962) (1931); THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL

PHENOMENOLOGY (David Carr trans., 1970) (1938). In a less philosophical, more sociological
vein, see ALFRED SCHUTz, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (1932). In some

respects we take cues from versions of phenomenology other than Husserl's, for instance
recognizing the situated character of social phenomena. Cf PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALIT (1961).

We do not contend, as Husserl did, that one can reach a universal, objective reality by
using the phenomenological method of investigation; that would be solipsism. We agree
with Gilbert Ryle that introspection does not even yield a complete form of self-knowledge.
See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 165 (1949). Phenomenology, like other methods
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guarantee that the search will not end with the conclusion that
independence means nothing and our sense that judges have it is false.
But this remains to be seen.
A

Freedom
Our model judge will find that independence is not easy to define. She
will quickly conclude that it does not mean "freedom" in the sense of
being able to decide cases autonomously as she sees fit or as justice,
however perceived, requires. Such a notion of independence has no place
in our law, where judges are always constrained in some degree, in some
form or another. In law, there are always boundaries delineating the
outside possibilities of judicial decision-making, but within those outer
boundaries there is more or less room to maneuver. Think about driving
late at night on an empty eight-lane highway. One can choose to change
lanes, veering to the left or to the right, or one can decide to change
speeds, using second gear instead of fifth. One can even choose to turn
around and change directions. Yet the car has to stay on the road or
risk accident and severe damage. The same holds true for the judge.
Judicial independence may only be the ability to change lanes within
clearly demarcated boundaries-and then sometimes only if there is
nobody around to notice.
Such boundaries to judicial decision-making may not be necessary in
the philosophical sense. A people could choose to subject themselves to
judges who decide each case entirely according to their own lights,
guided only by inner compasses pointing to the right decisions. Judges
would pay no regard to precedent and by their decisions create no
precedent. One might expect any such judiciary to have some limits;
cases could not be decided on the basis of which litigant gave the judge
the most money, perhaps, or the tenure of judges would be of short
duration. But in our legal system, we want judges to decide cases not
according to what they think is right but by what "the law" is and by the
weight of the evidence.' Indeed, any judge trained as an American

of understanding the world--such as structuralism, see CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (1958), and behaviorism, see B.F. SKINNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF ORGANISMS
(1938); RYLE, supra-renders only partial explanations of reality. Because no method
persuasively explains everything, the pursuit of the partial is not only justifiable, it is
necessary.
Phenomenological introspection also requires infinite regress because one must always
introspect each act of introspection. Nevertheless, judicial independence is a cool state,
unlike panic or fury which some believe to be immune from introspection. Cf RYLE, supra
at 166 (on introspectible states).
25. This is not always easy to do. One of the authors is a federal district court judge
and in his first year on the bench, he held a bench trial concerning what a very nice young
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lawyer expects this of himself, and yet still ordinarily feels independent
in adjudicating cases.
In The Problems of Jurisprudence," Richard Posner writes that
"[ilndependence is something judges want the way academics want
On the level of sheer desire, Chief Judge Posner may be
tenure.'
correct. But the freedom of a tenured scholar is not a particularly apt
comparison to the judge's independence. Independence is supposed to
attach to the judge instantly by the nature of her office, it is not
something she must earn. More substantively, the freedom of expression
associated with tenure is unavailing to the judge. An untenured
academic limits his expression, if not thought, by attempting to avoid
offending a tenure committee. This can be doubly constraining since he
can give offense not only by opposing the view of his elders (and being
"naive"), but also by supporting them (and being a "toad"). After gaining
the grant of tenure, the scholar can agree or disagree without fear of
losing his house because of his controversial or offensive ideas. Of
course, the university may not be very nice to him if he writes that the
sun circles the earth,' Montezuma was a Martian,' or the Holocaust
never occurred,'m but he will not be fired.

man (to keep things simple and anonymous) did to preserve his livelihood against what he
reasonably believed were the dangers posed by a feckless and mean-spirited man. What
the nice man did was, in the eyes of the law, as clear as a breach of duty (which he clearly
owed) as anyone could conceive. Despite what seemed "right", the law required a decision
against the nice man-a decision that forced the nice man to sell his home to satisfy the
judgment. When this author presented the case to a judicial colleague known to ignore law
when it interfered with his personal sense of equity (to keep things simple and
anonymous), the colleague opined, "Well, the only thing you can do there is cut the

damages to the bare minimum."
26. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMSOF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
27. Id. at 6.

28. Although the scholar might defend himselfby insisting he is really at the forefront
of a paradigm shift. Cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(1962).
29. Pulitzer Prize-winning psychiatrist and professor at Harvard, John Mack has
openly embraced the claims of some that they have been abducted by space aliens in UFOs.

See Jill Neimark, The HarvardProfessor& The UFOs, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 1994, at
46.
30. What is perceived as anti-semitism may well cost the tenured scholar the
chairmanship of his department. See Susan Chira, CUNY Ousts Chief of Black Studies,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1992, at Al (reporting the removal of outspoken Professor Leonard
Jeffries from chair of City College's black studies department). Or, then again, maybe not.
See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994) (ordering the reinstatement of Jefries
on First Amendment grounds).

Of course, one can never be too sure of anything. See

Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994) (vacating appeals court judgment and
remanding case for reconsideration).
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If the independence of tenure is the ability to spout freely controversial and fringe ideas, then it really has very little in common with
judicial independence."1 The judge does not have the tenured scholar's
freedom to speak and write on topics of her choice. Every judge is
limited to the issues that arise out of the litigation before her, as spun
by the litigants and their strategic objectives. Indeed, the case itself
only comes before the judge thanks to the random selection of a judicial
assignment procedure in the jurisdiction or the courthouse. A judge
wishing to rewrite the constitutional doctrine of commercial speech will
-have no opportunity to do so in a maritime slip-and-fall case. Principles
of jurisdiction may be so ingrained that judges would not attempt to be
too adventuresome in their choice of topics for legal pronouncements.
Consider Ambrose Beirce's fable:
An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was sitting by a river
when a Traveler approached and said:
"I wish to cross. Will it be lawfl to use this boat?"
"It will," was the reply; "it is my boat."
The Traveler thanked him, and pushing the boat into the water
embarked and rowed away. But the boat sank and the Traveler was
drowned.
"Heartless man!" said an Indignant Spectator. "Why did you not tell
him that your boat had a hole in it?"
"The matter of the
boat's condition," said the great jurist, "was not
32
brought before me."

While ingrained notions of jurisdiction may not be quite as vicious as
Beirce imagined, the fact that they are ingrained suggests that judges
will rarely go searching for any issue or topic that suits their fancy. The
tenured academic, by contrast, gets paid to do just that.
Outside of issuing opinions on legal issues, a judge faces an array of
limitations on what she can say and where she can say it. The Code of
Judicial Conducts prohibits a judge from making political speeches,'

31. Perhaps the professor comes closest to the role of the judge when the professor
grades the work of his students. Though a judge and a professor must each determine
winners and losers, at least the judge is spared the dreadful realization that if the right

information is lacking in the written work of those who come before her, it's partially her
own fault.
32.

AMBROSE BIERCE, FANTAsTIc FABLES in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE

294(1911).
33. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). For a series of articles concerning the ability
of judges to speak freely both within and without the courtroom, see Symposium: The

Sound of the Gavel; Perspectiveson JudicialSpeech, 28 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 795 (1995).
34. CODE OF JUDIcIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(2) (1972).
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making any statements that detract from the dignity of the office, s
commenting publicly on the merits of a pending or impending action,
making any statements that cast reasonable doubt on the judge's
impartiality,8 7 and testifying voluntarily as a character witness (even
on behalf of those with exceptional character)." Few of these things
are denied tenured professors, giving strong indication that the independence associated with the freedom of tenure differs greatly from the
independence associated with the judicial office.
The confluence of limitations on what judges can say in public and in
the context of a case is a real restraint on the ability of judges to
influence the general shape of the law. Judges are generally limited to
their particular cases and controversies, though clearly their influence
is felt there. Imagine if an academic could only write on those issues
and topics raised by his students in class. Now imagine the same
scenario, only now the students and professor are joined up randomly,
the professor having no particular expertise and the students being in
class more or less unwillingly. That may approximate the environment
of judicial independence as we know it.
When judges want to take a controversial stand on important public
issues, they often have to remove their robes and put aside their gavels
to do so."' Consider the federal sentencing guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentences required in criminal cases. Judge Jack Weinstein
of the Eastern District of New York has become a leading advocate for
repealing the mandatory minimums.4 But Judge Weinstein felt that
to be so forceful an advocate required him to recuse himself from
considering any minor drug cases, lest his personal opinions on a
controversial issue cause him to deviate from the unambigous rule of
law. If tenure gives an academic the freedom to speak his mind, such
a freedom
is available only to the judge if he is willing to forsake being
41
a judge.

35. Id. at Canon 5A.
36. Id. at Canon 3A(6).
37. Id. at Canon 4.
38. Id. at Canon 2B.
39. Yes, we know that virtually no federal judge ever personally wields a gavel. But
we admire the image of the judge laying it aside, a more graceful gesture than ripping off
the robe.
40. See Jack B. Weinstein, The War on Drugs is Self-Defeating, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8,
1993, at A19.
41. Few judges would understand this as well as Judge Weinstein, who was a tenured
professor at Columbia Law School before being appointed to the bench. See Arnold H.
Lubasch, Creative U.S. Judge who Disdains Robe and High Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
1991, at B5.
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One of the most significant differences between the independence of
academics and that of judges is that, while academics speak and write,
judges do something far more coercive in pursuing the judicial function.
Judges issue orders to be enforced, if necessary, at the point of a gun.
In the words of Robert Cover, "Legal interpretation takes place in a field
of pain and death ... signal[ing] and occasion[ing] the imposition of
violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text,
and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children,
even his life."' Even if his rhetoric is overheated, Cover is right that
judges do not operate merely in the world of ideas, they operate the
mechanisms of government that involve themselves and often control the
lives of citizens.'
Within the multi-lane highway that marks the boundaries of judicial
discretion, whatever independence judges have is tempered by their
awareness that their choices are often quite risky and dangerous. If
there can be little doubt that the decisions judges make affect people in
direct and powerful ways, we can be equally certain that judges remain
fallible in the exercise of their power. Just like the rest of us, they will
make mistakes. A temperance to their independence is the understanding that some of those mistakes may be immeasurably costly to our
nation; is there a better example than Dred Scott?" Indeed, the outer
boundaries of discretion are themselves established to limit the
frequency and impact of serious judicial error. The vast majority of
mistakes made by judges will be considerably more routine and less
costly-a misread precedent, an exclusion of a probative piece of
evidence, or a bad ruling occasioned by miscommunication with counsel.
In addition to such inadvertent error, judges take actions that they know
may be erroneous because the right answer is not always clear and they
have to rule one way or another. Precedents are often hazy, and lines
of cases often lead in conflicting directions. Yet judges must choose
between competing alternatives, often with full awareness of the fact

42. Rebert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
43. Cf Harris v. Alabama, 116 S. Ct. 1031 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of
Alabama law allowing judges to override juries' recommendations against death sentences
in capital cases).
44. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (arguably occasioning the Civil War).
For discussion of a few other contenders, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and
Narratives: Can JudgesAvoid SeriousMoral Error?,69 TEX L. REV. 1929 (1991). Then
again, if the studies of some are accurate, then there is reason to believe that judges cannot
really do that much to affect society, and when they try they simply lead us down the path
of costly, painful, and pointless struggle. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE
(1991).
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that no one option stands out as "right," and that every option has an
impact on someone's life.
If there is anything like a component of "freedom" in the idea of
judicial independence, it is reminiscent of the freedom most of us tried
to claim as teenagers vis-A-vis our parents. "Let me make my own
mistakes," we insisted. Judges depend on the same ability to make
choices in a world of alternatives, choices that they know may prove
wrong over the course of time. For most mistaken rulings, judges escape
any sort of punishment. Probably most minor mistakes in the daily
operation of the courthouse go completely undetected. Even with those
discovered through the appellate process, there are few if any adverse
consequences to the offending judge. There is no real threat of
impeachment (unless, of course, the error involved a measure of
illegality). Unlike the lawyers that practice before them, judges do not
lose clients for doing a bad job. Hypothetically the judiciary as a whole
could devise some sort of system that would inflict penalties on judges
for making mistakes, say automatic salary reductions for every ruling
Such a system might well provide for more
directly reversed.'
consistent, error-free adjudication and make the judiciary as an
institution more effective and efficient in achieving its operational
mission. But yet we allow our judges considerable leeway and they
know they will not be punished for having erred. They know that so
long as they make their choices in good faith, they will not be punished
for having erred, unless one regards a harsh editorial in the local
newspaper or a critical case comment in a law review as punishment. 46
Why are we so forgiving of these mistakes? Somehow we comprehend
the inevitability of judicial error, particularly in the pursuit of that everelusive "justice." Perhaps we recognize that just law, like self-government, is best achieved out of dialogue and deliberation, a process that
must be tolerant of mistakes. The marketplace of ideas envisioned by
Justice Holmes was premised on the unenviable reality that "[elvery
year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some

45. This hypothetical indicates some of the larger constraints that are felt by judges
which are not captured by a structural analysis of judicial independence. Imagine the
Constitution provided that neither the Congress nor the President could reduce the salary
of judges, but the judicial branch could do so. There would still be an independent
judiciary in the structural sense, but there may no longer be independent judges.
46. One might wonder if an introspective analysis would consider damage to one's
historical reputation as punishment. But the fact of the matter is that few of us ever get
to enjoy the fruits of earning a reputation in history, and it is far from clear how many
judges really feel constrained by a desire to be well regarded in the history books (or at
least on the obituary page of the New York Times). For those judges who worry about such
things, we concede that this would constitute an additional punishment.
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prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. 7 Holmes understood that
we must make room for mistakes: "[The Constitution] is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment.' s Few of us lawyers have not been
influenced by Holmes' words. While we desire the "Truth"--or justice,
or harmony, or whatever-we know from the dynamic nature of human
life and thought that law will be in eternal pursuit. The only difference
between the greyhound and us is that we are not running in circles after
a false rabbit, though perhaps a deconstructionist would disagree. The
mistakes of the past-and no one can deny that the past is full of
them-offer many valuable lessons, but not a full set of reliable rules to
live by. Mistakes are many and our model judge will find a glimmer of
independence in the fact that she is allowed a certain amount of room
to make them.4 9

47. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. One of the truly fine 20th century Italian writers, Leonardo Sciascia, often wrote
novels set in and around court proceedings. In one of his most well known, Open Doors,
he dramatically evoked how, in the perspective of the judge, it is essential that mistakes
go unpunished. In the climate of Mussolini's fascism, Sciascia's judge, with the concurrence
of jurors, returns a politically incorrect verdict, refusing to impose the death penalty in a
case where the State thought it appropriate. One of the jurors later engages the judge in
conversation telling that he, the juror, refrained from evading jury service just to make a
gesture against the death penalty. The judge remarks:
"I must admit I could have got out of this trial too; in fact, I was advised to do
so by someone in authority. But I saw it as a point of honor-of my whole life-of
living."
"So we did it[," the juror replies.] "But how will it end?'
"Badly," sa[ys] the judge.
Later still the judge talks to the prosecutor, who says:
"I want to understand. That's why I wanted to talk to you this morning, to
understand what's happening to you now, what you feel, what you fear. Not about
your career, which you have gambled away and you knew from the first; but about
your conscience, about life .... "
The prosecutor continues:
"I can tell you exactly what will happen: the court of cessation will annul your
verdict and assign the trial to the superior court at Agrigento, where, rm sorry to
say, there's a president who has a weakness for the death penalty. There's also
an old Socialist lawyer at Agrigento; I think he was once a deputy; a good lawyer
and, needless to say, marked down as anti-fascist. This lawyer will certainly take
on the defense, which is all that's required to present this trial as a clash between
fascism, which comes down inexorably upon crimes of violence, and anti-fascism,
with its squalid defense of them; which will no doubt have a secondary, retroactive
effect on you and on your verdict. It will end with the death sentence; the
defendant will be shot. So what will your verdict have achieved, except to prolong
the agony?"
The judge explains:
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B. Neutrality
Is independence reducible to "neutrality"? By neutrality, we mean no
preference for one party or another, no bias, shall influence judicial
decision-making. Between the parties before the court, the judge should
have no leanings towards one over the other. There is some evidence
that federal judges think independence can be defined as neutrality.
These judges write and approve their own Code of Judicial Conduct9o
and the first words of that Code are "A Judge Should Uphold the
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary."51 The second sentence
of the Code says "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society."5 2 Invoking the import of independence,
on the one hand and integrity and honor on the other, is quite a bit
easier than spelling out what those concepts mean. The Code defines
integrity and honor at least implicitly. A reader of the Code can infer
that integrity and honor are what a judge has when she personally
observes high standards of conduct,' obeys the law," does not lend
the prestige of her office to advance the private interests of othersO
does not belong to organizations that discriminate on the basis of race,
sex, religion, or national origin," maintains her dignity,"7 discloses
her financial interests," and stays out of politics.",

"it'strue that for me the defense of principle counted for more than the life of
the man. But it's a problem, not an alibi. I saved my soul, the jurors saved
theirs, which may all sound very convenient. But just think if every judge, one
after another, were concerned to save his."
"It won't happen [V responds the prosecutor.] "[Ylou know that as well as I do."
LEoNARDO SCIAScIA, OPEN DOORS 73-79 (Marie Evans trans., 1992). Sciascia's judge was
not from any viewpoint "independent." He did not even speak as an independent judge
speaks, his judgment was an act of defiance and protest, a defense of a principle to which
he was committed. There is no common language between this courageous Italian judge
and an American federal judge because the latter would never have to sacrifice his job,
perhaps even his life to the government, in pursuit of deeply held principle. This is how
important it is to know that you cannot be fired for what someone-what perhaps
everyone-believes is a wrong decision.
A reader interested in Sciascia might consult Gore Vidal, Sciascia's Italy, in UNITED
STATES 461 (1993).
50. CODE o JUDicIAL CONDUCT (1972).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at Canon
Id
Id.
rd. at Canon
Id. at Canon
rd. at Canon
Id. at Canon
Id. at Canon

1.
2A.
2B.
2C.
5A.
6.
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What about independence? The rest of the Code's provisions are
largely designed to insure neutrality and the appearance of neutrality.
The judge must act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in his impartiality,® should not allow family, social or other
relationships to influence his judgment,"' should accord all interested
persons a full right to be heard in proceedings that are orderly and
decorous,' should not publicly comment on the merits of pending or
impending actions,' should make appointments only on the basis of
merit," should never hear cases in which he or his family has an
interest,' and should never, do or say anything that would cast
reasonable doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that
may arise in the judge's court." The Code contains little about
"independence" apart from neutrality, strong evidence that impartiality
is part of the core of what judges consider "independence" to be.
Judges communicate their neutrality to litigants and the larger public
in a variety of ways. One method by which such messages are conveyed
is through the exclusive wearing of the simple, stark black robe by our
federal judges. It is a colorless garb, signifying, it would seem, the
impartiality of the judicial actor with regard to the parties before her.
There is a mild paradox in the fact of a judicial uniform. While we
never talk about "congressional independence" or "executive independence," we often talk about "judicial independence," even though judges
are the only ones .who all have to dress alike. Federal judges, at least
in modern times, all have to wear the same black robes.
The judicial uniform may nonetheless hold some keys to understandingjudicial independence. If the colorless robe signifies impartiality and
freedom from taint, then its shade seems inappropriate. Traditionally,
white is the shade of purity, the non-color that connotes lack of taint.
The blackness of the judicial robe sends another sort of message, it
seems, and one that indicates some of the limits to a judge's independence.
Consider the nature ofjudicial robes in England. There, the signifying
messages of judicial robes are of a different sort than here. In England,
judges wear a variety of different robes, ranging from full bright red

59. Id. at Canon 7.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at Canon 2A.
Id. at Canon 2B.
Id. at Canon 3A(2) and (4).
Id. at Canon 3A(6).
Id. at Canon 3C.
Id. at Canon 3C.

66. Id. at Canon 4.
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ones (worn with long white wigs) to skimpy black ones (worn with small
wigs) to ordinary business suits (with no wig at all but occasionally with
a toup). The nature of the robe corresponds to the individual judge's
position in the institutional hierarchy of the judiciary. The robes
communicate not merely neutrality, but institutional office and rank.
If the uniformity of blackness of American federal judicial robes' is
incapable of marking different institutional ranks, there is a different
institutional message signified: that each judge partakes of membership
in a class of judges, that each belongs to the judiciary and has responsibilities to that institution. All our judges are marked as members of the
same defined class ofjudges. The black robe signifies a larger community of judges to which the particular adjudicating individual belongs; it
signifies membership and the attendant duties and obligations of this
institutionally-defined group. The judge is not really neutral. Rather
she adopts the perspectives, standards, and beliefs mandated by her
institutional office. The judge is emphatically indoctrinated-tainted, if
you will--distinguished from the rest of us by her membership in a
unique group.
Independence and the wearing of uniforms do not ordinarily go handin-hand. If we think of other uniformed people, such as, for example,
priests and military service personnel, independence seems decidedly out
of place. Yet, military personnel and priests each share important
things with judges. On the one hand, we want judges to be a bit like
Catholic priests; no matter which one you go to, you should get the same
answers on matters of doctrine (if not on the gravity of the sins and the
degree of penance that must be served). The uniform ought to overtake
and subsume the individual who wears it. If the law were some
objective reality "out there," each judge should be able to discern the law
equally well and come to essentially similar results. Though experience
may lead us to believe that this does not in fact occur, our desire for
constancy and predictability in adjudication leads us to this hope. By
contrast, we recognize the vast differences among military personnel and
their capabilities. We know that there are great commanders; Patton,
Lee, and Washington were quite unlike the others who wore their
uniforms. And in any battle, who the commander is makes all the
difference in the world. The individual in this case can outshine his bars

67. Chief Justice William Rehnquist's recent decision to wear a black robe lightly
adorned by four simple gold stripes on each arm challenges the heretofore uniformity. See
Linda Greenhouse, The Chief Justice Has New Clothes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, § 4, at
4. Because the Chief Justice reportedly intended to pay homage to a character in Gilbert
and Sullivan's comic opera "Iolanthe," and not to distinguish his robe to suit his
institutional office, see id., we think the adornment has little relevant semiotic importance.
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so long as his creativity and imagination do not go against orders.
Ironically, we want the same of our judges, hoping that they can achieve
greatness and make the law the best it can be. Judges thus occupy a
troublesome place between anonymity and personality, open to criticism
for any form of independence they assert, even if they were encouraged
to exercise it.
One other uniformed group bears a close resemblance to judges, sport
referees and umpires. Their often striped vestements distinguish them
from the (also uniformed) competitors. Like judges, they make findings
of fact (e.g., whether the tennis ball struck the net on the service), and
nuanced judgment calls (e.g., whether the conduct was "unsportsmanlike").' Yet with regard to independence, it is fair to say that referees
and umpires have more of it than do judges. We tolerate, even respect
those referees who exercise their discretion to call a game "tight" or
"loose." Most fans want the referees to let the players decide the
outcome, condemning those referees who call close penalties late in a
game. Some referees have been fondly praised for never allowing
important players to foul out of basketball games. Note, however, that
independence for referees is not protected by the types of structural
guarantees that supposedly assure judicial independence. Tenure and
salary protections are not provided by law (though, for reasons other
than independence, they may be guaranteed by contract). If a referee's
exercise of independence is encouraged, a particularly aggregious
mistake may well cost the referee his job. For instance, the official who
put three seconds back on the clock in the 1972 USA-USSR Gold Medal
basketball game and gave the Soviets a second chance to score a final,
game-winning basket (which they did) has reportedly never again been
allowed to officiate in international competition. It is ironic that one bad
call in a sporting event can cost a referee his job for life but a federal

68. Consider this instance, involving famous N.BA referee Earl Strom:
[Pat] Kennedy [, the N.BA.'s first famous referee,] was gone by the time Strom
reached the pros, but his spirit pervaded an elite corps of eleven referees,
including the choleric Sid Borgia; the patrician Mendy Rudolph; Norm Drucker,
known for his soothing manner toward outraged partisans; and Arnold Heft, also
known as the Growler, who could out yell any coach alive. At the first officials'
meeting that fall, Strom was excited but not overawed. He thought he had found
his proper level and he felt at home. He heard [Jockol Collins, the head of all
officials, and the rest echo his own evolving viewpoint: that a referee must weigh
a rule's intent, and not merely its language, before making a call.
Jeff Coplon, The Right Call, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 1990). We know of no one who has
called for referees to consider what judges have often been called to consider, voluminous
legislative history. This analogy to referees was noticed by Mark Falcone, Esq., who
provided good insights but did not do enough work on the article so that we can blame him
for any shortcomings.
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judge who repeatedly errs at the expense of people cannot be put out of
office.
The judge's membership in the institution of the judiciary leaves the
judge with a sense of constraint by the very group to which she belongs,
bound, in a sense, to the blackness of her robe. But the extent to which
a judge is constrained from her peer group is not fully captured by
examining the judicial uniform. In any community, members will often
feel themselves limited in their independence because they must conform
to the social or peer group expectations, lest they be considered deviants
and subsequently excluded from communal life. In other words,
reputation among your peers counts and constrains.
Within the rank of judges, reputation and community standing limit
the exercise of independence." A judge is less likely to rule in a
different, non-conformist way if she believes the community ofjudges she
inhabits will be hostile to her novelty. If she feels she is likely to lose
status, she may well choose a more conventional route to avoid making
waves. This phenomenon is not uncommon in the professions, of which
we can say judging is a particular sprout growing out of the branch
called "lawyers." But with the large expansion of the professions over
the course of this century, professional standing is not the force it once
was for most professions.70 There are too many lawyers now for the
profession as a whole to rely on social status, enforced by a closely
attentive body of professionals, to maintain community standards. But
judges remain relatively few in number, and within jurisdictional
boundaries, they tend to keep up their sense of community. This is
achieved through judicial conferences and, most importantly, through an
implicit system of communication created by the judges talking to and
about one another, trading stories and information about other members
of the club. Sit down with a federal judge and you will be amazed at
how much she knows about the district court judge in Kalamazoo who
runs the court calendar in such-and-such a manner. The levels of
community to which the judge will respond may vary. It is the entire
class of judges that is marked by the blackness of the judicial uniform.
But it may be even more common for a judge to feel constrained by a
69. Judicial independence may also suffer from the "Greenhouse Effectt No, judges
are not adversely effected by global warming due to diminution of atmospheric ozone;
rather, this terminology was popularized by D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Laurence
Silberman to refer to federal judges whose rulings are guided not by accepted tenets of
judicial philosophy, but by a desire for good press coverage from legal reporters such as
Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times. See Martin Tolchin, Press Is Condemned By a
FederalJudge For Court Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at A13.
70. See Arlin M. Adams, The Legal Profesion: A CriticalEvaluation, 74 JUDICATURE
77, 80-81 (1990).
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more immediate group of judges, such as those within her circuit or,
better yet, within her building. Not even judges want to be frowned
upon when they get into the judges' elevator at lunch time.
This phenomenon is not without its irony, at least when it comes to
judges sitting in courts of last resort. If we look back at the famous
jurists of American history we find that a willingness to try the novel,
to lead the way, is a characteristic that distinguishes them. What this
means is that the judges we most admire tended to challenge the
accepted standards of the law-and ultimately reinvent those standards
and establish new ones. When one thinks of a Marshall, Holmes, or
Cardozo, one conjures up an image of a leader among judges, men who
were independent not merely vis-k-vis the other branches of government
or the litigants they faced, but also vis-It-vis the judiciary and its
prevailing rules and standards. The norms of the judicial community
may permit this of a judge in a court of last resort, but neither easily nor
often. A challenge to established doctrine often requires disregard of the
rule that judicial opinions ought to be candid and accurate; new law is
often created by misrepresenting it as old law or law that is only a little
bit new." And this is the dilemma the creative, independent-minded
judge must confront: lacking the status of a Cardozo or a Holmes, her
innovations are not likely to be welcomed with open arms. Consequently, she will likely restrain her creativity to maintain her standing in the
community and therefore prevent herself from ever achieving the exalted
standing that attaches to the great jurists. Judicial independence is,
thus, similar to credit. An individual cannot exercise certain forms of
judicial independence unless she has already established herself as
independent. Lacking the social standing of the "great ones," the judge
is unable to assert her independence.
C. Jurisdictionand Power
One of the frequent subjects of scholarly debate over structurallydefined judicial independence in recent years has been whether or to
what extent Congress can constitutionally limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.7 2 Article III, section 1 of the Constitution 3 vests the

71. One notable instance of this was Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo's "creation" of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel as an alternative to consideration in De Cieco v. Schweizer,
117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). See Joshua P. Davis, Note, Cardozo'sJudicialCraft and What
Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 777 (1993) (analyzing Cardozo's opinion in De
Cicco). We put "creation7 in quotes because Cardozo was not promissory estoppers sole
inventor. He built on burgening understandings of the law shared by some members of the
professional community. See id.
72. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 5.
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'judicial power' in "one supreme court" but neither creates nor mandates
the creation of any other federal courts, leaving that to the discretion of
Congress which "may from time to time ordain" to be so creative. 4
Even the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be limited by
"such Exceptions, and ... such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." 5 Many have wondered whether Congress could constitutionally
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts so to keep judges from ruling
on some important and controversial constitutional issue if legislators
perceived the judiciary to support a legal rule that the legislators
disapproved.
This is an interesting question, but! one with considerably less
relevance to judicial independence when considered through introspective lenses. Congressional limitations on jurisdiction, as a general
matter, do not affect significantly the way judges feel about their
independence. Independence to the judge turns on the amount of
discretion she has in deciding a particular issue before her and not on
whether she can hear the issue in the first place. This is due to the fact
that judges inhabit an environment with manifold limitations on their
jurisdictional authority. Judges are not allowed to entertain issues
brought into court after the applicable statute of limitations, no matter
what their sentiments of justice require. They are not allowed to decide
disputes that properly belong in another forum. They cannot issue
advisory opinions. Federal judges can rule in diversity cases only if
there is indeed diversity of citizenship among the parties--and then only
when the amount in controversy is sufficiently high. All of these are
important jurisdictional limitations that simply deprive judges of the
ability to rule. Because of familiarity with these limitations, judges are
not likely to conclude that withdrawal of the basic ability to rule on a
specific issue is much of an infringement on their independence.
The core problem that sparks the debate over congressional limitations
on federal jurisdiction seems more about back-door constitutional
amendment than about judicial independence. If the Congress were to
limit the judiciary's ability to hear, say, :First Amendment cases, what
would be most disturbing is that such a jurisdictional limitation would
effectively amend the text of the Constitution. Without judicial review,
Congress could indeed abridge freedom of speech and be unconcerned
about being overturned. For all intents and purposes, the Constitution

73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
74. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943)
(Congress' constitutional discretion with regard to establishing inferior courts presumes

power to limit their jurisdiction).
75.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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would have been amended. And though the fact of amendment is hardly
disconcerting on its own, Congress would here have managed to
effectuate the amendment without going through the proper constitutional procedures. It would be anomalous to interpret congressional
power under Article III, section 2's "Exceptions" power to include the
ability to amend the Constitution by nothing more than majority vote in
light of the intricate and burdensome amendment procedures of Article
V's Then again, maybe Chief Justice Marshall
was wrong. Maybe it
77
interpreting.
are
we
Constitution
a
not
is
The Framers had considerably more faith than most modern lawyers
in the ability of the individual states to preserve constitutional rights.
They did not believe it was necessary to create inferior courts because
they presumed the states would exercise their plenary jurisdictional
authority. In the post-Brown era, lawyers became wary of the ability of
state courts to protect competently our constitutional rights. The fear
is that, left to the state judiciaries, our constitutional rights would be
subject to various, inconsistent treatment. But this precise problem
points out why we ought to worry less about Congressional efforts to
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congressional attempts to
amend the Constitution underhandedly by limiting federal jurisdiction
would surely be stymied by the variety of independent state court
interpretations that would be beyond the control or influence of
Congress. Attempting to impose order here would only lead to unpredictable (and from Congress' view undesirable) consequences. State
courts would still hear the First Amendment cases the federal courts no
longer could and their legal pronouncements may be more radical or
more conservative than Congress intended. Certainly, they would be
more varied and inconsistent. Moreover, so long as the federal courts
retained jurisdiction in other areas, they would find a way to exercise
judicial power. Traditional First Amendment controversies might
become privacy cases. Or perhaps federal courts would hold that the
right to express one's self freely is a "fundamental right" under equal
protection. To be safe against federal judicial review, Congress would
nearly have to abolish the federal courts, a move so revolutionary that
any political environment in which it occurred is difficult to conceive

76. Some legal scholars have argued that there may be room for constitutional
amendment outside of the procedures established in Article V. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Akhil R. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending
the ConstitutionOutside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
77. Chief Justice Marshall wrote his famous line in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 415 (1819): "We must never forget it is a Constitution we are expounding." The line
has been repeated too often to count in judicial decisions ever since.
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from our present perspective, so difficult that we could not say where
judicial independence would stand in the mind of a judge of that era.
We might then be able to say against Chief Justice Marshall, there is
nothing at all left to interpret.
An introspective understanding of judicial independence teaches that
independence may be perceived by the judge as the freedom to issue
final judgments in cases, judgments which cannot be reversed by anyone
other than another independent judge. In other words, judges have
power to conclude cases that is theirs and theirs alone. In April 1995,
the Supreme Court adopted this principle for final judgments in Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farms,Inc.,"8 and though it did so on avowedly structural grounds, a close examination reveals the introspective sense of
independence that grounds the Court's decision.
In Plaut, the Court found unconstitutional a federal statute which
directed federal courts to reinstate (on motion by plaintiff) certain
securities law claims that had been dismissed with prejudice for failure
to file within the applicable limitations period. The Court held that the
dismissals were "final judgments" and as such Congress could not
require that the courts reopen them without invading upon the courts'
constitutional province of "judicial power."
The Court's reasoning was not based on precedent; the majority noted
that this was a case of first impression, even though the practice of
legislative reversal of court judgments had been common prior to the
American revolution 79-highlighting how few infringements of judicial
independence have occurred in the past two hundred years. Indeed, it
was the colonial practice and the Framer's response to it that proved
dispositive for the majority. In pre-revolutionary times, legislatures
regularly required the re-opening of individual cases.' The Framers,
most notably Madison, Hamilton, and Jay in The Federalist,were critical
of these legislative endeavors, finding them to be an infringement of
what they perceived to be the judiciary's proper authority.8 1 Accepting
the Framers' argument, the Court in Plaut insisted that it made no
difference if Congress mandated the re-opening of a class of cases as
opposed to individual adjudication.
To be sure, a general statute such as this one [compared to one devised
to re-open an individual case] may reduce the perception that
legislative interference with judicial judgment was prompted by
individual favoritism; but it is legislative interference with judicial
78. No. 93-1121, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2843 (Apr. 18, 1995).
79. Id. at *15-27.
80. Id. at *15-17.
81. Id. at *19-22 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48, 78, 81).
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judgments nonetheless. Not favoritism, not even corruption, butpower
is the object of the separation-of-powers prohibition. The prohibition

is violated when an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded
for even the very best of reasons, such as the legislature's conviction
(supported by all the law professors in the land) that the judgment was
wrong; and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments are
legislatively dissolved.
The heavy reliance of the Court on the intent of the Framers, inferred
from the historical context of colonial life and a few brief passages in The
Federalistand other publications of the period, indicates the influence
of introspective understandings of the judicial function and of the nature
of judicial power. The Framers' ideas and justifications are by definition
pre-constitutional and pre-structural. When one asks what it is they
meant, or as in Plaut what it is they meant to change, one answers at
least implicitly with the Framers' introspective sense of judicial
independence. Though it may be difficult to discern with clarity, the
Framers had some substantive understandings about what judicial
independence was, based not on structure but on insight and reflection.
They adopted structural rules, such as those of the Constitution, to
protect and guard those understandings from infringement. In other
words, an introspective sense of judicial independence under-girds the
structural arrangements with which we are now so concerned. To refer
back to the Framers' intent is to realize the importance of introspection
in defining the mandate of judicial power.
D. Removing the Ties that Bind: The Place of Loyalties
Part of what it means to be independent is to be able to adjudicate
cases without being unduly bound by personal or sociopolitical loyalties.
We do not pause to define exactly what we mean by "unduly bound,"
partly because it would take more than a pause and partly because if we
took the time we would still come to the conclusion that the question is
one of judgment, not definition. For our purposes, it is enough to say
that a judge is unduly bound if she cannot decide the case in light of the
law and the evidence because to do so causes too much emotional pain.
Or put another way, a judge is unduly bound if the judge cannot decide
a case in a particular way because the judge is a man or a woman, a Jew
or a Christian, a black or a white, or a Democrat or a Republican. This
is distinct from the concept of neutrality discussed earlier, which was the
lack of loyalty to one side or another on a personal basis. Here, we are
concerned with the loyalties one has to one's group-sexual, ethnic,

82. Id. at *31 (emphasis added).
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religious, etc. Such loyalties, the model judge will discover, also threaten
to impede the independent adjudication of cases.
The Code of Judicial Conducts mandates disqualification of a judge
from hearing a wide variety of cases in which the judge has (or is likely
to have) some personal bias. These usually involve personal or financial
relationships;" few things sway one as forcefully as nepotism and cold
cash.' Canon 2B states, "A judge should not allow his family, social
or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment.ss
By its terms, this might cover relationships based purely on racial or
ethnic identity, gender, political party, religion and so forth under the
rubric of "social or other," but this seems a strained reading. Indeed,
nothing in the Commentary suggests that Canon 2A is explicitly directed
to larger group loyalties.'7
If judicial independence is partly the ability to decide cases regardless
of political loyalties, consider the example of Judge John Sirica, a
longtime Republican who played an active and substantial role in forcing
out the truth in the Watergate case. He did so by the close questioning
of witnesses and by raising the very real threat of very long prison
sentences for defendants whom he saw as uncooperative.ss Eventually
one defendant involved in the break-in at Democratic party headquarters
delivered a letter to the judge in which he admitted that the whole truth
had not come out; it was the first large crack in the dam. The Watergate case did substantial damage to the Republican party, as the judge
suspected it might. Judge Sirica described his own ties to the Republican party as long and deep and not merely philosophical. He was an
elected party official who campaigned for its candidates and rounded up

83. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
84. Id. at Canon 3C.
85. We are reminded of former Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo, who, when questioned
about the propriety of his naming his brother Joe city commissioner, is reputed to have
responded angrily, "Nepotism my ass. He's my brother."
86. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B.
87. Id. at Commentary to Canon 2A.
88. Judge Sirica was widely criticized for assuming the role of prosecutor and the court
of appeals agreed with some of those criticisms, though ultimately concluding.
The public interest in safeguarding a record from taint [of perjury] is particularly
keen when the case involves the integrity of the nation's political system-as can
fairly be said when persons in the campaign of one major political party used
clandestine contributions to penetrate the internal process of the other-and is
consequently of moment in both the daily press and history. Judge Sirica's
palpable search for truth in such a trial is not only permissible, it was in the
highest tradition of his office as a federal judge.
United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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He was a friend of Senator Joseph

[If it had not been for the Republican party, I might never have done
much better than my father, who died at sixty of a heart attack after
years of trying desperately to build a secure life .... I traveled to
various parts of the country in 1940 and 1948 for Republican presidential candidates .... I had no money to speak of, and one of the best
ways that I knew to make something of myself was through politics.
I stuck with the party long enough to see Dwight Eisenhower and...
Richard Nixon, elected in 1952. Without the backing of President
Eisenhower and his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, I would never
have realized my dream of becoming a federal judge."
Yet Judge Sirica did not even hesitate about pushing the outside of the
envelope to get at the truth. He believed the United States had "a
totally independent judiciary"90 and that the "judiciary, standing above
politics as the enforcer and arbiter of our laws, was the critical branch
of government in the resolution of the Watergate crisis."91 The judge
did not give his political loyalty a second's thought, despite the debt he
felt he owed to the Republican party.
There is reason to suspect that, when some people talk about being
free from socio-political loyalties, they only mean free from those
loyalties that they, as commentators or spectators, do not approve. The
current state of the appointment and confirmation process gives some
support to this view. In recent decades, activists have sought to secure
the appointment ofjudges who were thought to be "dependable" on some
series of issues. Some administrations have claimed a desire to appoint
judges to the federal bench who would be opposed to Roe v. Wade.'
Others vowed to appoint only judges who would support Roe. If all
presidents and senators respond fully to the will of activists, an electoral
change is not a positive for judicial independence because new administrations will not value the trait of independence any more than did the
old. Maybe from time to time there is a new manager of the ball club,
but the game being played is' the pretty much the same.
From the view of a judge, it is ironic that independence may come not
from disregarding loyalties, but from maintaining them. A judge is to
exalt one form of cultural loyalty, a loyalty to a judicial ethos, over all
else. To understand why this is, it is necessary to grasp the cultural
dimensions of judicial life. Law, like any significant realm of social and
89. JOHN J. SnuCA, To SET THE REcoRD STRAIGHT 297 (1979).
90. Id. at 300.
91. Id. at 300-01.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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political activity, has a specific culture. Culture is the assignment of
meanings to behavior;" as Clifford Geertz writes, it is an "acted
document."' When we "assign meanings" we provide ourselves with
ways to make sense of the events and emotions that occur around us.
A batted eyelash evolves from a physical movement to a "wink7 due to
the cultural meanings we project onto the behavior.
Culture has a few basic functions: it explains, justifies, and orders.
When a social group attaches meaning to situations and events, it serves
to explain what has happened, the relationship between the actors and
their environment, and the consequences of what has occurred. And in
the social realm, as opposed to chemistry, explanations also serve to
justify, adding normative weight to the meanings we have assigned.
Due to the normative force of the justifications offered by culture,
participants in the milieu will tend to order their own behavior to fit in.
Hence culture orders, directs, and shapes how people behave and act.
Because they come to associate some behavior as "bad" or "worthless"
and do not want themselves identified with the same negative labels,
people will try to behave in a manner deemed acceptable by their
particular culture. Whatever the mechanism--or the terminology of the
social scientist-people try to play by the cultural rules.
Law, as an identifiable culture, manifests these characteristics. So
cultural norms like stare decisis govern, requiring judges to adhere to
precedent for the sheer reason that our culture-and not our constitutions nor our statutes-demands it. Stare decisis illustrates the kinds
of commitments that judges take on due to their cultural environment.
It constitutes a loyalty, an imposed fidelity that is to constrain the judge,
who will come to believe that following precedent is the right thing to do
and the proper way to adjudicate cases. In American legal culture,
loyalty to stare decisis is matched by loyalty to "The Constitution," a
sense of higher commitment to the principles (articulated or not) in our
foundational text and from which no judge is ever to stray."
It is precisely when a judge is adhering to one of these cultural
loyalties that she may feel the most independent. If Judge Sirica was

93. See generally EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959).
94. CLIFFORD GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 10 (1973).
95. On the cultural dimensions of "The Constitution," see SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). It may be that we want judges to forsake obligation to
abstract principles in certain instances. Former Mayor of New York Edward Koch tells the
story of a judge who was mugged, and then called a press conference to announce that the
mugging would in no way affect his judicial decisions in matters of that kind. An elderly
lady stood up in the back of the room and shouted, "Then mug him again" See JAY M.
HAFRITz, THE HARPERCOLLNS DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITIcS 312

(1992).
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independent, it was because he was bound to the right loyalty, not
because he was in any sense free to conclude the case in any way he
wished. He was loyal to his "responsibilities"--read cultural norms-as
a judge, instead of being loyal to his political party. Another example
might be how the justices of the Supreme Court might have felt upon
deciding Planned Parenthood v. Casey," where the Court upheld the
right of women to terminate pregnancy (affirming, at least in some
senses, Roe v. Wade)." After years of pressure on the Court to reverse
Roe, the Court asserted independence by citing a forceful allegiance to
the Constitution," public legitimacy," and the legal-cultural norm of
stare decisis,ec among others. "Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control
our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code."'' Judicial independence is, to the
judge, the exaltation of the right obligation."°
For most of American history, judges have managed successfully to
avoid sacrificing their fidelities to the cultural norms of law by not
giving in to outside pressure. Certainly there are episodes, but overall
judges have been remarkably successful in preserving their independence from such influences even when their decisions were highly
unpopular.' 3 But many of those who would congratulate judges for
being politically independent are less certain about whether judges
should be free of gender, ethnic, or other social group loyalties. To
decide against the interests of one's own group risks the penalty of
exclusion. A judge who decides a case "as she sees it" rather than how

96. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
97. The joint opinion would prefer that we say "essentially affirming." See id. at 2817
("[W]e have concluded that the essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed."). Id.
98. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813 ("In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life,
changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation
could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional duty.-). Id.
99. 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
100. Id. at 2808 (describing "Itihe obligation to follow precedent"). Id.
101. Id. at 2806.
102. Casey also highlights one of the difficulties posed by the intersection of
independence and cultural loyalties: because culture is always open to interpretation,
there will often be disputes about what loyalty to it requires. Hence, the dissenters
asserted that they were more loyal to 'The Constitution" than the majority; they implicitly
claimed to be more independent. Id. at 2810 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
103. Adherence to prevailing norms in law does not immunize the judge from morallyquestionable results, as legal norms may reflect morally indefensible norms existing in the
broader society. See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (on ante-bellum judges in
South).
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the members of her group see it may be castigated in the community for
being a "traitor." The judge will lose status as a "true" Christian, Jew,
man, woman, Latino, black, white, etc. Group membership leads some
to believe group loyalties should be the most profound. A Jewish judge
who votes to affirm the First Amendment rights of Nazis is in this
uncomfortable boat. Justice Clarence Thomas may be there as well in
light of the Open Letter 1' sent to him by a fine jurist now retired, A.
Leon Higginbotham. On the eve of Thomas' appointment to the bench,
Judge Higginbotham called on the new justice to take up group loyalties:
But to be your own man the first in the series of questions you must
ask yourself is this: Beyond your own admirable personal drive, what
were the primary forces or acts of good fortune that made your major
achievements possible?... Even though you had the good fortune to
move to Savannah, Georgia, in 1955, would you have been able to get
out of Savannah and get a responsible job if decades earlier the
NAACP had not been challenging racial injustice throughout America?
If the NAACP had not been lobbying, picketing, protesting, and
politicking for a 1964 Civil Rights Act, would Monsanto Chemical
Company have opened their doors to you in 1977?... If you and I had
not gotten many of the positive reinforcements that these organizations
fought for and that the post-Brown era made possible, probably neither
you nor I would be federal judges today .... While there are many
other equally important issues that you must consider and on which I
have not commented, none will determine your place in history as
much as your defense of the weak, the poor, minorities, women, the
disabled and the powerless. 1' 5
If Judge Higginbotham's letter had simply emphasized the last
point-that judges ought to be committed to protecting the powerless
and under-represented-it would be a different matter. As it is,
however, one cannot read Judge Higginbotham's letter without
concluding that Justice Thomas is being instructed to be loyal to the
NAACP and other civil rights organizations. A frequent litigant before
the Supreme Court, the NAACP may purport to represent the interests
of minorities, but simply because the NAACP takes a stand on some
issue does not unambiguously mean that stand is best for anyone' or
that its position is the best constitutional result. Judge Higginbotham
104. A. Leon Higginbotham,An Open LetterofJustice ClarenceThomas From aFederal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1991).
105. Id. at 1014, 1015, 1018, & 1025.
106. According to some in the black community, mainstream civil rights organizations
like the NAACP have lost touch with many blacks, particularly the working class and the
young. See Michael Eric Dyson, Ben Chavis Wasn't The Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1994, at A27.
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seems to be calling for Justice Thomas to favor a particular litigant
when it appears before the Court in disputes. Why? Because, according
to the tone of Judge Higginbotham's letter, "the NAACP got you here;
you owe it." Would the Watergate case have been decided differently if
Judge Sirica had followed Judge Higginbotham's advice?
To some extent, judges have always faced the possibility of losing
status within one's group for not acting, or deciding cases, as the group
demands. Many of the judges who enforced desegregation laws in the
South lost status as "true" whites or "real" southerners. (Perhaps most
wrenching, their families were also subjected to the same ridicule.) Will
the pursuit of diversity in the federal bench make matters worse?
Diversity is a popular word lately but to the extent it means that a
judiciary ought to be "representative" of the nation in some way, the
concept is not new. For many years, presidents had to consider
geographical diversity in nominating judges, particularly justices to the
Supreme Court. When Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was under consideration for appointment to the Court, it was understood that he was
competing for the Massachusetts seat vacated by Justice Horace
Gray; °7 no one from California or New York need apply. Indeed, when
President Herbert Hoover replaced Holmes with Benjamin Cardozo, it
was explicitly noted that only Cardozo's widely acknowledged eminence
allowed his appointment as the third sitting justice from New York.'08
Geography was a good proxy for culture, and it was important to our
ancestors that the bench have the requisite percentage of yankees to
southerners. There has been at times a seat on the high court reserved
for justices steeped in the federal specialties-admiralty, patent,
bankruptcy-to bring their special perspectives to the body. Few think
this "diversity" brought much harm to the Court.
The newer diversity, courts filled with judges representative of various
ethnic, racial, and gender groups, should do no harm either. In fact, it
may not even be all that new. With Cardozo, the Massachusetts seat
was transformed into the Jewish seat, subsequently filled by Jewish
Justices Felix Frankfurter, Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, and-after a
two decade interruption by the Protestant Harry Blackmun-now Steven
Breyer. ° Today, the phenomenon is even more pronounced, due to
the increased involvement of women and minorities in political life.
There are risks that a judge might take seriously the call to "represent"

107. G. EDWARD WHITs, JusTicE OLivER WENDELL HoLMzs 299 (1993).
108. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 204-06 (1992).

109. The Jewish Louis Brandeis sat on the Court before Cardozo, but was not part of
the line of Jewish justices that directly succeeded one another. The same can be said of
current Jewish justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
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some groups in society more than others, that is to represent that group
in some way other than by excellent performance on the bench. The
threat is that the judge will trade fidelity to the cultural norms of law
for those of a social group. There is no reason to believe that judges of
any race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation would inherently be
any more likely to demonstrate bias toward their own than do white
male judges toward their own. The risks may be exacerbated though by
making group membership the explicit basis for appointment. Here the
notion that one should "represent" that group may weigh heavily on the
judge because it is group membership that led to the judge's position.
The intensity of pressure upon the judge is increased by the justification
that some offer for diversity: that if an X type judge is appointed, more
X type parties will win cases and hence will finally find justice in the
courts. Diversity among judges ought to be justified as a demonstration
of an open society, in which equality of opportunity is real, not imagined.
If it is proven that gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. are
inherent causes of different perspectives important to law, then diversity
can be justified on that ground as well. When diversity is justified on
the premise that the judge will have socio-political group loyalties that
replace our constitutional and cultural ones, we will not have advanced
the cause of judicial independence.
E. Being at Ease; Or, the 71ght Fit Between Complacency and
Independence
Our model judge will discover upon reflecting on her experience that
judicial independence is only possible if she is self-satisfied in at least
one very important way; she has to be content in her position as a judge
with no driving ambitions to be anything else. A judge in pursuit of
something other than adjudicatory excellence, say fame, fortune, or
prestige, may subordinate her institutional role as a judge to her
personal, non-judicial desires and wants. A judge may want, more than
anything else, to write a great novel, to top Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, or to run a three minute mile. Canon 5' permits judges to try to
do these things so long as the judge's time needed to do judicial work is
not interfered with. Ambition in the arts, or sports, or science is
unlikely to be helped or hindered by whatever a judge decides in the
cases she hears. Of all the controversies surrounding People v. O.J.
Simpson, a memorable one occurred when Los Angeles Superior Court
Judge Lance Ito gave a lengthy interview to a local television station

110. CODE OF JuDIcIAL CoNDuCT Canon 5.
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that aired over several nights and sparked criticism of the jurist."
While it was clear that Judge Ito had not violated any established
ethical rules, some criticized him for nothing more than hypocrisy, in
light of the fact that Ito had previously castigated the press for its
coverage of the case. A more serious concern was that the interview
seemed to some an indication that Judge Ito was seeking the spotlight
and the personal fame that accompanies it. Perhaps, questioned some,
Judge Ito was interested in making a name for himself or looking for
appointment to a higher court.11 2 A quest for media attention, the
public favor, or a better job threatens to divert a judge by tempting him
with goals other than doing justice in the individual case. Would Judge
Ito rule to suppress the DNA evidence not because its prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value, but because such a decision would result
in higher book sales of his eventual memoir? We are of the opinion that
this concern was unfounded in Judge Ito's case, but the underlying point
remains valid: slavishness to fame, fortune, or career ambition is still
slavishness, and it can destroy whatever independence the judge has.
We characterize the lack of desires for public fame as one element to
a larger necessity for judicial independence, being at ease. Two
underrated requirements for our model judge to be at ease include good
prisons and short memories. Judging is often about deciding winners
and losers. Two parties come into the courtroom and generally only one
goes home happy-and then only if that party's attorneys have not yet
delivered an itemized bill for services rendered. Many of the cases
federal trial court judges decide involve violations of the criminal law,
bringing the violent, the rebellious, and the insane into federal
courthouses.' 3 Among the criminal defendants, there are plenty of
unforgiving types who would love to get their hands around a sentencing
judge's neck. The threat of being attacked might be enough to steer any
sane human being away from independence and toward self-preservation. It thus may be that the most notorious threats to judicial
independence in recent memory have not been from any efforts by the
executive or legislative branches to interfere with adjudication but the
spate of violent attacks on federal judges. In the past two decades, two
federal judges have been targets of mail bombs (one, Eleventh Circuit
Judge Robert Vance, was indeed killed), one was murdered in his home

111. Kenneth B. Noble, Simpson Judge UnderFirefor TV Interview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1994, at B7.
112. See Tim Rutten & Henry Weinstein, Jurists Give Mixed Scores to Judge Ito's
Performance, L. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1995, at Al, A22.
113. And, yes, sometimes the innocent. But even the innocent may be driven to
aggression by the fear of an incorrect verdict and a substantial prison term.
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by the angry father of a litigant (District Judge Richard Daronco), and
another was shot to death by a sniper carrying out a contract "hit
(District Judge John Wood,.Jr.)."' Some physical courage (or at least
blindness to danger) is requisite to being a judge capable of independent
adjudication. Most judges know that a very angry and skilled person
can, with some luck, end the judges' lives because of something they do
as judges. Perhaps, in light of the numbers, it is only a small risk but
small is not the same thing as insignificant. When judges do not feel a
reasonable degree of personal security, any independence they have can
succumb to fear.
In order to maintain an independent stance, the judge thus relies on
strong prisons. The judge rests easy in adjudication and sentencing
because she knows that those convicted will not be able to get at her.
She need not fear that an accused will pull a handgun out at sentencing
because the jail procedures are relatively strong when it comes to guns.
A convicted felon will be locked up behind bars, far from the courthouse.
Of course, few prison terms last forever and convicts do eventually get
out of jail. And many of the losers in the judge's courtroom will be civil
litigants who lose bundles of money but never find themselves behind
bars. 7b insure her personal safety, and hence her independence, the
judge has to rely on something other than good prisons. Most judges
have to rely on the losers having short memories. Perhaps the losers
will forget my name, the judge tells herself. More likely, the losers will
eventually forget the anger and thirst for vengeance that might have
driven them to violence in the short term. Whichever, forgetfulness is
undoubtedly a key to judicial independence. There are few things
scarier for a judge than being recognized on the street by someone who
stops and says, "Hey, you were the judge in my case way back in .... "
It reminds her of the ever-present possibility of less friendly encounters.
Fortunately, they are rare, and judges can generally operate in an
environment of personal security and hence afford to exercise whatever
independence they have freely.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that judicial independence exists in a web of overlapping
constraints and obligations which arise not out of the other branches of
government, but out of the judiciary itself and the social and cultural
environment judges inhabit. Judges may consciously sense each of these
constraints holding them back or directing their adjudication forcefully,

114. See Lee May & Ronald Ostrow, Federal Judges Warned About PostalBombs, L.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at Al.
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and feel, as a result, that they are not truly independent. But if the
myriad of constraints is inevitable (and they seem to be), when does a
judge ever feel independent? Could the answer be never? Well, yes and
no.
A judge may feel truly independent, paradoxically enough, only when
she has fully digested and internalized the relevant social, cultural, and
judicial norms, rules, and preferences. When the judge knows where the
boundaries to her discretion are-and comes to understand and largely
agree with them-then she will feel the comfort necessary to sense
independence. For example, if a trial court judge knows precisely what
the rules of evidence require with regard to a question of admissibility
then she will be able to rule without thinking about where the boundaries lie. When she accepts the propriety of those boundaries, she will
not fight against them but instead will work within them naturally and
without much thought. To return to our earlier metaphor of the vehicle
on the empty, multi-lane freeway, the judge will believe herself liberated
once she is familiar with the road and stops crashing into the guard
rails.
In our understanding, judicial independence is not complete independence in the sense that its possessor may do whatever she wishes.
Indeed life offers no such independence under any meaningful circumstances. Everyone must understand their boundaries, the person of
independent means is never a person of unlimited means. The need for
boundaries is so profound that a judge who is confronted with a legal
issue that is utterly without precedent will likely not sense an exhilarating independence in her free reign, but rather the same feeling as a
sailor might have in a borrowed boat lost in the mid-Atlantic in the
moments after opening a sealed mapcase and discovering that she has
no maps. Independence is the ability to choose, but no one wants to
choose without some idea of the consequences of that choice. Even the
man in the famous short story knew there was a lady behind one door
and a tiger behind the other.
The sense that there is some power that belongs to judges and not to
anyone else corresponds to structural arguments based on the Constitution's specification of judicial power." But the introspective sense of this
power may be as vague as the term "judicial power." If scholars disagree
on what the power is and where its existence is a barrier to legislative
control of courts, they will get no clearer rule by consulting the
introspection of judges. The sensibility of judges shifts with time and
circumstance. An example is the belief of many judges today that an
essential-not to mention painful and difficult-act ofjudging is passing
sentence on a convicted criminal. Judges have often believed that the
selection of one sentence out of an enormous range was part of the core
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of judging. By the middle decades of this century, this belief was an
article of faith, even though most judges thought the task was inhumanely difficult. When Congress took-much of that discretion away with
the federal sentencing guidelines, the protests ofjudges were anguished,
sincere, and widespread, even among those who recognized that
discretionary sentencing was a relatively recent artifact of the criminal
law. As new judges come to the federal bench, many of them will see the
sentencing guidelines as fixed in their universe, never having the power
or the burden of broad discretion in sentencing. They will not miss what
they never had. They may criticize the application of a particular
provision or rule, but they will not perceive that they are denied judicial
power, much less power essential to independence.
This may be the ultimate strength and weakness of an introspective
approach to understanding judicial independence. If the structure of the
Constitution is in most important respects fixed and static, how judges
themselves understand and interpret their judicial role and their
independence as a matter of experience will constantly evolve and
develop. What introspection reveals today, for these interpreters, may
or may not be what is significant tomorrow.
Why then consider the introspective sense of judges? Some might
quarrel with our decision to add an introspective angle to the problem
of judicial independence. Your view, they might say, does not help to
solve the constitutional dilemmas likely to be faced by a court of law.
The insights it offers may -not lead us to clear answers on matters of
legal doctrine. We borrow our response in part from Learned Hand, who
often said that "nobody gives a damn what we [federal appeal judges]
say."115 He left unsaid the clear implication that no one would care
about the opinions of those even lower on the totem pole of legal
mavens-a group encompassing everyone in the world (including us)
except, perhaps, the President, members of Congress, a few state
supreme court judges, and whichever law professor has succeeded to T.R.
Powell's role as the unofficial tenth Justice. Hand was wrong, but only
slightly. People care about what judges and legal commentators think
but only on the rarest of occasions, when a particular "hot" issue is on
the table. It seems that many of the questions addressed in this
symposium are not likely to come before any court in the near future,

115. Unable to find this direct quote, the authors consulted Judge Hand's biographer,
Professor Gerald Gunther, who remembered reading such a statement in several of Hand's
letters though he could not remember which. Telephone Interview with Professor Gerald
Gunther (Jan. 3, 1995). In light of Professor Gunther's excellent biography of Hand,
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994), his expertise is surely sufficient support
for this citation.
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and even if we are wrong, few specific issues of judicial independence
will likely be "hot" enough to mandate deep research into its solution.
In any case, our theory is influenced by the recognition that theory about
what is practically necessary is often a poor predictor of what is truly
essential in practice.
Even if no one cares what we say about judicial independence, judges
are likely to consider their introspective senses of it, consciously or
otherwise, in deciding what independence is and what is inconsistent
with it if and when litigation over judicial independence arises. Given
the fact that judicial independence in our time is unquestionably
accepted as good and inherent in the Constitution, the definition of its
limits will fall to judges. And their collective judgment, based on the
introspection of each as individuals, will determine the stand of the
judiciary and, ultimately, the state of the law for the Nation.

